Efficient and Secure Provisioning for the IIoT

　　在2016秋季黑客招募了成千上萬的嵌入式設(shè)備，以形成惡意僵尸網(wǎng)絡(luò)。他們的未來惡意軟件感染的寬帶路由器，讓僵尸網(wǎng)絡(luò)的運營商使用他們的分布式拒絕服務（DDoS）攻擊。這是一個喚醒的新興物聯(lián)網(wǎng)（物聯(lián)網(wǎng)）產(chǎn)業(yè)-顯示如何黑客可以使用網(wǎng)絡(luò)智能設(shè)備為自己的目的。

　　雖然未來的攻擊集中在消費設(shè)備，對物聯(lián)網(wǎng)產(chǎn)業(yè)的影響是嚴重的。沒有對策，工業(yè)工廠面臨類似大規(guī)模攻擊的犧牲品。風險范圍從失去生產(chǎn)到嚴重損壞連接機械。安全專家的分析表明，黑客的受害者的設(shè)備制造商作出相對簡單的錯誤。在未來的攻擊的情況下，很少有保護路由器免受黑客登錄和上傳他們的新固件。

　　Groups such as the IoT Security Foundation （IoTSF） have issued recommendations designed to protect against similar attacks. The IoTSF identified measures that would protect against Mirai. They include the need to ensure access codes or passwords are unique to each unit and are not shared among a group of devices. Even if the hacker is able to discover the password for one， they are not able to log into others with the same access credentials. A further recommendation is that devices should protect against having firmware loaded into them that has not been digitally signed by a trusted provider.

　　Although the answer is to have credentials that are unique to each unit， this can be difficult to manage from a logistical point of view. IIoT systems become very expensive to deploy if each device needs to be provisioned individually by an expert installer. It is also a strategy that increases risk because numerous devices may need to be configured by a small group of people – making them prime targets for industrial espionage and social engineering attacks.